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Abstract
In modern Bulgaria corruption is one of the significant concerns plaguing the
current legal system. With historical roots in the Ottoman Empire and the Communist
regime, Bulgaria faces challenges in sustaining a strong judicial system that holds its
members accountable. Since the transition from communism to democracy in 1989,
Bulgaria’s biggest challenge has been reforming its judicial system to combat corruption.
Despite the number of reforms to the system, the Bulgarian legal system is perceived to
be among the most corrupt in the world. Addressing the issue of corruption in Bulgaria’s
legal system is only possible through reforms centered around creating an environment
where corruption cannot be easily practiced. These reforms must specifically attend to
matters of judicial independence, accountability and discretion in the judicial system. The
objective of this thesis is to answer three questions: what are the most significant faults of
the Bulgarian judicial system that contribute to corruption? Where did these errors come
from? How can they be resolved?
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Introduction:
Bulgaria could certainly be considered the hidden gem of Europe. Located at the
heart of the Balkan Peninsula, it provides tourists with extravagant hikes, wonderful
landscapes, and incredible food. Operating in its own currency, travel is cheap and the
people are kind. However, as a former communist nation, one might not consider
traveling to this rather remote country. With the democratization of the nation in 1991
and its entry into the European Union in 2007, Bulgaria has opened itself up to the world.
At the same time, as Bulgaria has rapidly emerged from its years of communist rule, its
not-so-pretty corrupt legal system had been able to surface. Is Bulgaria’s legal system
indeed corrupt? If so, how did it become so? Is it possible to fix Bulgaria’s legal system?
It is an indisputable fact that Bulgaria’s legal system is, to some extent corrupt.
Part 1 of this analytical study concentrates on an explanation of the intricate concept of
corruption. Obtaining knowledge of the concepts and facilitators of corruption on a
broader level is an important first step to take before delving into the complexities of the
Bulgarian legal system. In addition to this theoretical research, Part 2 looks at corruption
as it is manifested in legal systems on a very broad sense.
If Bulgaria is in fact corrupt, the question emerges, how did it become so?
Corruption does not emerge in a nation overnight. Part 3 expounds on the complicated
history of Bulgaria. Ruled by some of the most notoriously corrupt regimes in modern
history, Bulgaria’s corruption is rooted in its backstory. The Ottomans and Communists
helped to create the corrupt legal system Bulgaria has today.
The inner workings of the current legal system in Bulgaria are depicted in Part 4.
As a parliamentary republic, Bulgaria adopted a judicial system with specified court,

1

prosecution, and administrative institutions. Given the structure of the system, and the
historical roots of Bulgaria, Part 5 identifies the main problem areas that have taken hold
of the Bulgarian legal system. Pervasively negative public perceptions, lack of
institutional and decisional independence, inefficiencies and structural problems, and lack
of accountability have created an environment in the legal system where corruption can
easily take place.
The final question we must ask ourselves is, how can Bulgaria rid itself of this
corruption? The last section of this thesis discusses possible solutions for Bulgaria’s
problems with corruption in its legal system. Challenging perceptions, strengthening
judicial independence, supporting a more efficient legal system, and changing levels of
accountability will help to resolve Bulgaria’s corruption problems.
This thesis does not argue, ultimately, that corruption can be completely eliminated
from Bulgaria or any other system. In fact, it is logical to assume that where there are
people with power, there will most certainly be misuse of that power to a greater or lesser
degree. The objective is to alter the environment around that power to make it difficult
for abuses to take place.
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Part 1: Defining Corruption
There are many questions to be asked when exploring the theory of corruption
and the framework surrounding it. A strong theoretical knowledge of corruption is
essential to understanding the fundamental details of Bulgaria’s corrupt judicial system.
What is corruption? Who participates in it? What acts can be considered corrupt? Why do
actors resort to such behaviors? Attempting to answer these questions will not be easy.
Chapter One is an effort to establish a scholarly framework and definition of corruption
in a broad sense.
What is corruption?
Corruption has been defined in various ways in the academic community. The
most widely accepted version of the definition of corruption is, “the abuse (or misuse) of
power for private benefit”. (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, 2003 p. 114). Transparency
International defines corruption in similar terms, offering that corruption is “the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain”. (Transparency International, 2011) Leslie Holmes,
author of “Rotten States” argues that these types of definitions offered by the academic
community are far too vague and do not address the specifics of corruption. Instead, she
suggests that “attempts to analyze corruption in a systematic and scholarly manner should
be abandoned”. (Holmes 2010, p 43) Holmes’ main argument is rooted in the idea that
corruption is perceived by societies differently. Despite Holmes’ argument, the academic
community has clung to these definitions and, for the purpose of this study, so will we. 1
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Holmes’ argument that corruption cannot be defined is not only an unworkable approach, it’s unrealistic.
Cultural differences between nations certainly alter the use of the definition of corruption, but these
differences are not so substantial that a general definition cannot be accepted. Holmes’ argument is, at least,
a reminder to consider cultural perceptions of corruption in the application of a general definition.
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Corruption can be defined on a broad level as being the misuse of public power
for private gain. In understanding the definition of corruption, it is first necessary to
determine what actions can be considered corrupt. Once these actions have been
determined, it is helpful to understand who participates in these actions and why.
What acts can be considered corrupt?
The framework of corruption is a complicated one. Establishing the power of
individuals in the public sector is only one piece of the puzzle. It is important to identify
the boundaries of the term “abuse” in Transparency International’s definition. Employees
in the public sector are given a lot of power. What behavior can be taken to constitute an
act of corruption? It is important to first consider the intentions of the participant. The
intentions of the facilitator are just as important as the act itself in determining
corruption. A person must knowingly be involved in a corrupt act in order for it to
constitute corruption. In addition this person or group must be seeking personal gain from
this action. If this gain is known by the actor, corruption is evident. Generally, one might
associate the term corruption with bribery. Corruption is not solely defined by bribery,
however. Deliberate acts in which officials abuse their power for private gain can be
manifested in a variety of venues. Figure 1.1 shows an example of some corrupt acts.
Corruption has many forms. Those listed in Figure 1.1 provide only a general view of
the many ways a person can abuse their power. Holmes admits to identifying a “twentytype classification” of corruption in post-communist nations. (Holmes, 2006 p. 31) With
only a quarter of them listed, Figure 1.1 should not be considered a comprehensive list,
but a broad understanding of the more common types of corruption that grow in the
judicial system. It is most important to consider the context of the act and the intentions
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of the actors. If there is any personal gain made by an action that takes abuse of power, it
is considered a corrupt act.
These forms of corruption are often difficult to measure because each act is
subjective to individual and cultural biases. Holmes’ argues that in order for corruption to
take place the society must perceive the particular act corrupt. (Holmes, 2006 p. 5) In
China, for example, it is often customary to give gifts for tasks, friendships, and
hospitality. In other nations, these acts might be considered bribery. It is important when
studying corruption to consider cultural norms and values. At times these shared values
are undocumented and are simply accepted nation-wide. In other instances public
perceptions can be found in polls and legal documents. Regardless, perception of
corruption plays a very big part in understanding the concept on a local level.
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Who participates in corruption; the Power of Public Officials
The general definition offered by both Transparency International and Doh, on the
surface, may seem as though it allows corruption to fit into even the most familiar aspects
of human culture. The idea of “entrusted” power can certainly be interpreted in a number
of ways. In any act of corruption someone with power must use his or her leverage in
order to achieve a personal gain. Since power is manifested in relationships between
people beyond political boundaries the application of the definition of corruption to the
private sector of life is possible. Parenting, for example, is often practiced with a
considerable amount of what might be considered to be corruption. A parent, a person
who holds power over his or her child, could abuse this power bribe their children to act
in ways they may not have, resulting in personal gain for parents. An employer might
swing a deal for his buddy, allowing him to be hired over a more qualified candidate.
Comparably however, a person in the judicial system has a greater amount of power than
the parent. What makes judicial powers so different?
The fact here is that these judges are “public officials” who hold public power.
Parents simply do not have public power entrusted to them. Corruption exists in the
public sector and is most important to examine because it ultimately culminates in an
exploitation of the sacred social contract between a people and its nation. Following
Lockean ideology2, citizens of a nation agree to a formation of government, as outlined in
a constitution, in which they all agree to give up a portion of their freedoms in return for
the benefits of living in society. The public sector has a tremendous amount of power
because it holds the moral responsibly of implementing the logistics of the contract.
2

As found in John Locke’s “Second Treatise of Government” (1869). Similar philosophies are held by Jean
Jacques Rousseau in “The Social Contract” (1762) These philosophers believed that the Constitution of a
nation is a contract between the people and their government.
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Magistrates, judges, and prosecutors even take oaths, promising to uphold the best
interests of the people.
The core of the public sector is outlined in constitutions and are given explicit
powers in society. In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) suggests a “who pays” criteria for deciphering what parts of the
work force are considered a part of the public sector and are therefore subject to
corruption scrutiny. There is certainly a fine line between public and private corporation
corruption. Whatever the line, judges are clearly on the public side since the powers of
the judicial system are distinctly outlined in the constitution. The legal system is therefor
a part of the public sector and is subject to corruption scrutiny.
Why do actors turn to corruption?
When an act of corruption takes place, it is the prerogative of those who hold
public power to choose to participate in corruption or to act honorably. Public officials
have a tremendous amount of responsibility to uphold the social contract. Both personal
and environmental or structural motives often encourage a public official to act corruptly.
Personal motives of public officials exist around personal situational issues. A
judge who is in dire need of money due to family issues may be more inclined to accept a
bribe than his co-worker who isn’t having family issues. In addition, it is logical to
assume that personal character and experiences can have an impact on a public official’s
choice to participate, or not partake in corruption. Regardless of personal motives, the
environment in which corruption takes place is of the utmost importance.
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Virtually all nations in the world have their share of corruption. But what makes
some systems more corrupt than others? According Robert Klitgaard, corrupt
environments can be summed up in an equation:
C = M + D – A.
Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. (Klitgaard 1998)
Klitgaard states that corruption takes place, “when an organization or person has
monopoly power over a good or service, has the discretion to decide who will receive it
and how much that person will get, and is not accountable”. (Kligaard 1998, p. 4) To
summarize, corruption exists when an environment is framed to allow power to be
allocated inappropriately to actors who are given too much discretion and not enough
accountability. Following this equation, corrupt systems exist when monopolies are high,
official discretion is high, and accountability is low.
Globally, systems often vary in their levels of corruption because of their diverse
abilities to address the issues represented in this formula: monopoly, discretion and
accountability. If there is a deficiency in the factors of the formula, an environment is
created where actors can easily get away with corruption. It is impractical to suggest all
corruption can be weeded out of any system completely. However, as we shall discover
below, cultivating an environment that contains and limits levels of corruption should be
the ultimate goal.
Conclusions:
Because of the ambiguous nature of corruption, defining it is certainly not an easy
feat. Perhaps this is why Holmes suggests that it cannot be successfully done. Despite
Holmes argument, a clear and concise definition of corruption is vital to this study of the
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Bulgarian legal system. Corruption can be clearly defined as a misuse of public power for
personal gain. This limits the actors of corruption to those who hold public power.
Establishing a framework in which to study corruption in a particular area of society is
indubitably feasible with the use of this approach. The framework established in the first
chapter is essential in investigating corruption in Bulgaria’s judicial system.
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Part 2: Corruption in Legal Systems
Why study corruption in Judicial Systems?
It is the job of legal systems to resolve disputes between both private and public
individuals, states and organizations. They work to promote an environment where
justice can be served for a nation’s citizens. Since the judicial systems in all governments
have a significant responsibility to the people, they are a vital part of the public sector,
and have a tremendous amount of power. In addition, most judicial systems are
established in a constitution, and are given enumerated powers. It is the judges’ job to
protect the law as outlined in the social contracts between a people and their nation. It is
exceptionally important that legal systems are not corrupted because of the tremendous
amount of power they are given.
The Law Library, an online network that provides materials for legal education,
suggests that, “there is not any real use in having a law if the people trusted with the
responsibility of defending it are corrupt themselves; they must lead by example if they
need others to respect the law.” (Law Library, 2011) Judicial systems that tolerate
corruption make it nearly impossible for corruption to be fought in other parts of society.
In order to fight corruption in a society as a whole, it is most important to ensure the
purity of judicial systems.
What makes a healthy Judicial System?
No legal system is perfect, but some seem to have a better way of combating
corruption than others. Establishing a legal system that evades corruption completely is
impossible. However, as we learned in the first part of this chapter with Klitgaard’s
formula, corruption needs a particular framework in order for it to take place. The
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environment must include people who are willing to abuse their power for personal gain,
and they must have the ability to do so in an environment in which accountability is
absent or minimal. Montesquieu once offered that, “Every man invested with power is
apt to abuse it.” With the amount powerful actors in any given judicial system, there is
bound to be some misuse of it. Since it is impossible to completely control individual
behavior, it is necessary to construct systems that have the ability to both prevent and
attend to cases of corruption effectively on a systemic level.
In order for corruption to be addressed, it is most important to understand the fact
that although human beings will be enticed by corruption, it is possible to fashion an
environment or system where it is difficult for them to act on these seductions. Robert
Klitgaard’s formula works well in creating a system that, on the whole, avoids corruption
or at least minimizes its occurrence. He claims that monopoly and discretion must be kept
in check and accountability must be relatively high. Consider the variables in Klitgaard’s
formula in relation to judicial systems. (C=M+D-A)
There are three important factors that contribute to the minimization of corruption
in a given legal system: 1) judicial independence, 2) structure and efficiency, and 3)
transparency. Achieving judicial independence helps to keep the monopoly (M) variable
at low levels. Discretion (D) can be kept in check using the proper structure and having
an overall efficient system. Lastly, accountability (A), arguably the most crucial part of
the equation, can be kept at high levels through transparency of the entire system. It is
important to understand that these variables correlating to Klitgaard’s formula are
intertwined and affect one another greatly. It is also important to bear in mind that these
qualities exist in certain degrees naturally in any system. However, the goal of any legal
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system should be to maximize these qualities while minimizing their corresponding vices,
resulting in the reduced likelihood and actual incidence of corruption.
1) Judicial Independence; limiting monopoly of power.
In order for judicial systems to combat corruption they must be completely
independent of parties, politics, and private organizations to prevent inappropriate
monopolies. In this context “monopoly” refers to the power of outside sources to
infiltrate the judicial branch and affect the decisions of individual judges. Judicial
branches and judges must operate, on the whole, independently and without political
and/or ideological influences. No system is perfect; disparate ideologies and politics
inevitably find themselves entangled in the judicial system to some degree. However, in
order for corruption to be addressed and hopefully minimized, the environment must be
altered to create a system that makes it difficult for external sources to become too
powerful within the judicial system. The concept of judicial independence can be broken
down into two very important prongs. In order to prevent the misallocation of power and
the creation of monopoly in judicial systems there needs to be both institutional and
decisional independence.
Institutional or branch independence is an age-old concept held by great
philosophers like John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu. Locke suggested in his Second
Treatise of Civil Government (1689) a theory of separation of branch powers. Locke
argued that in order for the liberty of the people to be protected, a government must be
structured in a way that power would not be given to one individual or a single body of
individuals. However these powers must be kept separate. The American Bar Association
suggests that institutional independence can be achieved through practicing judicial
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review of legislation. (ABA 2006) Furthermore judicial oversight of administrative
practices in the judicial system, judicial jurisdiction over civil liberties, and clear
enforcement of laws will contribute to strong institutional judicial independence. In
Bulgaria’s case, as addressed below, the judicial branch was not able to act independently
because of the Communist regime which successfully infiltrated the judicial system;
unfortunately similar behavior persists to this day.
Decisional, judicial independence refers to the personal decisions of judges in the
court system. The only thing that should hold “monopoly” over a court room is the law.
Judges need to be making decisions based on facts and the law, free from political and
popular pressures. If judges are intimidated by such influences or by financial coercion,
their verdicts will not likely be an accurate reflection of the law. In addition to
institutional safeguards, decisional independence must be implemented so that judges can
make these decisions freely, without be persecuted for them. Guaranteeing tenure and
immunity for their decisions, when they fall within the guidelines of the law, allows
judges to formulate rulings without agonizing over their jobs or even their lives.
It is important to understand that these measures are not intended to give judges
and judicial systems free reign in their court rooms. Tenure, immunity, and institutional
independence are essential in creating a group of independent judges that aren’t affected
by external sources. The point of these protections is to ensure that judges aren’t forced
into making decisions by anything other than the law. However, it is important to keep
judges in check through limiting their discretion and holding them accountable.
One could make the argument that giving independence to the judicial branch in
general, and judges in particular, creates a monopoly in the system; after all, judges hold
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all the power. Yet this is where matters become theoretically complex. Decisional
independence places great responsibility on magistrates in their court rooms. Ultimately
the decision to make an unbiased choice, based on fact and the law, is in their own hands.
Decisional independence is to create a system that does not force judges into making
decisions. However, if they are given too much discretion and independently choose to
act in a biased, self-serving, illegal manner, the system should hold them accountable.
This is where the variables correlating to Klitgaard’s formula are interdependent.
Judicial independence is important to combating corruption because it places the
focus on carrying out the law and not on outside or self-serving influences. Since
institutions and individuals can both be easily influenced by outside sources, it is
important to secure both institutional and decisional independence.
2) Structure and Efficiency; Limiting Discretion
Allowing judges too much discretion creates a perfect environment for corruption
to grow. Judicial independence is important in making sure that judges can decide on
matters of the law freely. This freedom gives judges more room in their decisions but in
no means does this give them full discretion. Legal systems are structured to prevent
judges from acting solely on personal inclinations. This can be easily done by
implementing a properly enforced system of appeals. It is also important to note the
importance of the efficiency of this structure and its impact on the overall efficiency of
the system.
Most systems are constructed in a hierarchal manner, supporting a process of
appeals where judges, in effect, check one another’s decisions. This process of appeals is
an example of how the structure of the legal system helps to combat corruption. Judges
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have been given the responsibility of ruling on matters of the law. If by chance these
judges veer from this responsibility, the structure of the system should catch these
mistakes. It is therefore extremely important for a judicial system to adopt a working
appeals process to act as a check on judges. Magistrates must also be subordinate to this
system; it must be taken seriously. Those who do not follow these processes should be
held accountable.
It is vital that judicial systems adopt an efficient way of filing paperwork and
getting cases from court room to court room. Structural mechanisms in the legal system
are useless if they aren’t practiced efficiently. If an appeal is made in the system the
paper work and filing systems must have the ability to send cases to the next court room
without too much delay. The everyday activities of the system should be carefully
watched; consistency is of the utmost importance. The structure and efficiency of the
legal system is vital to insuring a healthy rule of law. When a dispute needs to be settled
in court, it is the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that it can be settled in a system that
is structured and efficient. Ultimately, a legal system might look great on paper, but it
must be able to execute the policies and structural safeguards efficiently for them to
work.
3) Maximizing Accountability
Accountability is an important aspect of any legal system. Judicial independence
protects them from being forced into making decisions that aren’t based on law. Judges,
inspectors, and investigators are given a grave responsibility to uphold the principles of
administering justice, and thus presumably the implicit will of the people. The system
protects the employees, but what protects the systems from them? Corruption is
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manifested in individual acts. It is important to support an environment of accountability
where individual acts of corruption are less likely to place. There are two ways of
promoting accountability in judicial systems. The first is to promote high levels of
transparency. The second is to hold judges accountable through a code of ethics that the
system must adopt as a whole.
Achieving Transparency
The most effective way of assuring accountability in a legal system is through
transparency. Transparency is defined by TI as “a principle that allows those affected by
administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the
basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes.” (Transparency
International, 2011) LexisNexis, an online law database, suggests that, “Rule of Law
cannot exist without a transparent legal system.” (Rule of Law, 2010) The inner structure
of the judiciary isn’t enough to prevent systematic corruption within the system. It is
important that legal systems act with as much transparency as possible. Having a large
number of people and institutions involved with the oversight of the system will secure
the integrity of it. Judiciaries that practice transparency can see increases of legitimacy.
Additionally such policies foster better relations between the judiciary and other public
institutions and ultimately the citizens as a whole. A system that operates without
transparency operates “behind closed doors,” making it difficult to pinpoint corrupt links.
Higher transparency contributes to high levels of accountability within the system.
USAID, in its report “Guidance for Promoting Judicial independence and
Impartiality”, suggests a number ways to strengthen transparency in judicial systems. (US
AID, 2002) They claim that transparency of court operations, publishing judicial
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decisions, scrutiny of the courts by civil society, and disclosure of judges’ incomes and
assets are all helpful in creating a system that is transparent. Transparency International
defines transparency as:
a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business
transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and
figures but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil
servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and
understandably. (Transparency International, 2012)
Each of these measures contributes to higher accountability in the system and to
lower levels of corruption. In general, people are much less likely to participate in a
corrupt act if they know they will be caught. For example, having court decisions
released and available to the public holds judges and the legal system accountable to their
decisions. Following these procedures to achieve transparency ultimately results in higher
levels of accountability of the system and of its employees.
Code of Ethics
It is important for there to be a mechanism for addressing outright misconduct in
the system. Judges should be ruled by a code of ethics with a genuinely independent
board or committee to enforce these ethics. Having these types of structural safeguards
protects the legal system from falling apart from within. These safety nets are
instrumental in holding judges accountable, and are therefore very important in tackling
corruption in judicial systems. Proper administrative institutions should be in place to
ensure that magistrates are adhering to the law, the processes of the system, and the code
of ethics.
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Conclusion
In order for a legal system to work without corruption it must work to both
prevent and address any misuse of power. Healthy judicial systems are able to combat
corruption by supporting an independent judiciary, maintaining a transparent system, and
keeping personal discretionary levels as low as possible. Despite these measures, it is
important to keep in mind that a fool-proof system cannot exist. Nonetheless, Robert
Klitgaard’s formula (Corruption= Monopoly+ Discretion - Accountability) provides
scholars with a workable framework in order to create best-case scenarios in legal
systems.
It is important to consider these variables in relation with one another. Equalizing
the formula requires the interplaying of all these variables. For example, low levels
discretion can be attained through levels of transparency. At the same time, as
transparency rises accountability levels are raised as well. Understanding the interplay of
these very important concepts in the legal system will help scholars to create workable
systems.
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Part 3: Bulgaria- A History of Corruption
Bulgaria, located at the heart of the Balkan Peninsula, shares a border with Serbia
and Macedonia to the west, Greece and Turkey to the south, the Black Sea to the east and
Romania to the north. Historically, the Balkan Peninsula has a very interesting and
unique history. The story of Bulgaria starts in about 500 BC with the Thracian empire
and its occupation of the Balkan region. The first Bulgarian state was established in 681
AD. (Crampton, 1997) Since its creation, the Bulgarian state has been influenced by
some of the most notoriously corrupt empires in history; the Romans, Ottoman Turks,
and more recently, the Soviet Union. The faulty legal systems that these empires
supported set the stage for corruption in Bulgaria’s current legal system.
Of all the hurdles Bulgaria must face in reforming their current corrupt judicial
system, addressing these historical roots are the most challenging. The concept of
historical causation refers to the ability of specific events and experiences to affect the
flow of history. Just as humans, nations are affected greatly by their past experiences.
Bulgaria’s exposure to corruption throughout its history has certainly helped to create the
corrupt nation that exists today. 3
The Ottoman Millet System
The Ottoman Turks ruled over the state of Bulgaria uncontestedly for over five
centuries from the 1300s to the late 1870s.4 It is estimated by scholars that the Turkish
conquest of Bulgaria resulted in the massacring, enslavement, or deportation of almost
half of Bulgaria’s population. With the majority of the Ottoman Empire being Muslim,
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See for example Paul Pierson’s Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton
University Press, 2004) for an excellent exploration of this topic in depth.
4
For a more detailed history of Ottoman Rule in Eastern Europe refer to Inalcık, Halil. The Ottoman
Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600. London: Phoenix, 2000
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the region was ruled by the sharia, the Holy Law of Islam. In sharia Islamic law, the
Ottomans gave different rights to religious groups. The vastness of the Ottoman empire
contributed to the coexistence of multi-ethnic and religious peoples in communities
called “millets”. The sultan of the Empires assigned each millet a leader, giving them
each of them full jurisdiction over their people. These semi-autonomous populations were
established within the Ottoman Empire to practice tolerance of religions – in theory, at
least. The idea was that, as long as each millet paid its taxes, they could practice whatever
religion they wished. In reality however, this system contributed to deprivation of
universal rights under the law. It also effectively relegated those within the various
millets to second-class status, at best. (Crampton 1997)
Van Meurs and Mungiu-Pippidi, authors of Ottomans into Europeans, argue that
the millet system resulted in system where the rule of law was “based on one’s religion”
(Meurs and Pippidi, p 156). Despite the separation between the religions under the law,
these millets still had to coexist. Although each millet could take charge of its own law,
any dispute involving a Muslim had to be tried under Muslim law. Ultimately, the legal
system catered to the needs of the powerful Muslim class. For example, Ottoman law
prohibited Jews and Christians from buying land, carrying swords, and holding authority
positions over Muslims (Chua, p 171). Bulgarians were Orthodox Christians for the most
part and had to work their way around the pro-Muslim legal system in order to survive.
Some found that the only way they could be given any rights was to convert to Islam.
Corruption is manifested in situations where power is being abused for personal
gain. During the Ottoman Empire one religious group, the Muslims, were abusing their
power over the Empire for personal benefits. The system was clearly corrupt, in the
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following ways. Ottoman rule over Bulgaria severely affected perceptions of Rule of Law
in the region. Bulgarians became skeptical of legal systems because of their Ottoman
experience. After centuries of oppression, who could blame them? Meurs and Pippidi
suggest that Ottoman Rule in Eastern Europe, “compromised the development of the
ethical political understanding of the Rule of Law, and restricted its meaning within
rather narrow limits.” (Meurs & Pippidi, p 177) Bulgarians were trying to acquire justice
in a system which was not built to cater to their needs or even recognize their rights, as
understood in the modern world. It was a system that, as noted above, demoted them to
second-class status within the larger Muslim-dominant society. It is logical then to
assume that Bulgarians would turn to alternative measures to gain justice.
With the help of the Russians during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78,
Bulgaria was able to gain independence from the Ottomans. The Bulgarians declared
themselves independent. With hundreds of years of exposure to these corrupt legal
practices, Bulgaria was left to create its own system. It is important to note that at the
time of Bulgaria’s independence from the Ottoman Turkish Empire, few if any
international pressures or influences were in place – such as the OSCE or the Council of
Europe in post-WWII Europe – to help foster an accountable, politically independent
judiciary.
The Failures of the Constitutional Monarchy
Following independence Bulgaria’s new constitution, called the Turnovo
Constitution, was promulgated and declared the country a constitutional monarchy in
1879. For the first time since before Ottoman rule, the people of Bulgaria were
considered equal under the constitution. Frederick B. Chary, author of The History of
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Bulgaria, suggests that the constitution gave the monarch too much power. (Chary 2011,
p. 37) For example, the constitution allowed the prime minister and cabinet positions in
Bulgaria to be chosen exclusively by the monarch. With this power, Chary posits that
“rulers were able to bend the law to their whims.” This corrupt behavior contributed to
political unrest and instability and of course did nothing to help build an accountable
judiciary.
In addition to the problems with abuse of power in the monarch, Bulgaria was
entangled in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1914 over territories in the Balkans. It was in
the chaotic mess of the two Balkan wars and the World Wars that the Soviet Union and
Bulgaria started to become particularly close. The roots of this closeness go farther back,
however. Russian backing of the Bulgarians in the war of independence of the 1870s and
their help during the Wars contributed to creating a long lasting friendship between the
two countries. The Russian connection did little, however, to help establish an
independent judiciary and genuinely law-based social system.
During World War II Bulgaria’s monarch, Boris II, aligned himself with the
Germans and the Axis Powers. The political climate in Bulgaria could not have been
more volatile. By 1944 the most powerful political parties, with the Bulgarian
Communist Party in the lead, created the Fatherland Front coalition in opposition to
fascism. According to CIA documents from 1945, the Fatherland Front was said to have
been working with the Soviets to overtake the “fascist” regime in Bulgaria. When the
Red Army invaded Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front simultaneously staged a coup d’etat.
Thus began the Bulgarian Communist Party’s corrupt 45 year reign.
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Bulgaria’s Communist Legal System
A new constitution, the Dimitrov Constitution, was established and the monarchy
was abolished. Between the years of 1944 and 1990 pro-Soviet leaders like Georgi
Dimitrov, Vulko Chervenkov, and Todor Zhivkov took charge of Bulgaria. Richard Felix
Staar, author of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, points out that “the new basic
law [established in the Dimitrov Constitution] closely resembled the 1936 ‘Stalin
Constitution’ of the USSR”. (Staar, 36) According to the Stalinist approach, in order to
create a state-less, class-less society the government must become all-powerful to combat
rebellion against the ultimate goal of revolution. Stalinism, in principle, creates systems
that are susceptible to corruption by creating an environment where one group of people
has access to a tremendous amount of uncontested power. Given this trait of Stalinist
rule, it is hardly surprising that the regimes engendered by Stalinism have been
characterized, without exception, by acute and pervasive corruption.
The Bulgarian Communist Party exercised complete control between 1946 and
1989, abusing their power to support their own interests. As a part of Bulgaria’s newly
established Communist power, all opposing parties were purged from the government,
effectively creating a single-party state. Moreover, the government took over the
economy, nationalizing private enterprises, and placing it in the hands of the elite to
control and redistribute “evenly” among the classes. The American Bar Association
reports that upon the Communists’ establishment of power, the Bulgarian Judicial System
suffered severely.

23

Many non-communist judges, prosecutors, investigators, and law
professors were purged or killed. The judicial council, which had advised
the MOJ [Ministry of Justice] on personnel issues, was abolished; the
concept of an independent judiciary was rejected; and the Communist
Party took control of judicial appointments. The courts were seen as part
of the larger effort to consolidate and support a socialist system. (ABA
Judicial Reform Index, 2006)
In addition, before the Communist Party took power, the Grand National Assembly
convened to alter the constitution. The BCP banned these proceedings to prevent
changes.
In the 1940s the Communist Party took over in Bulgaria and implemented an
extremely corrupt regime. In Chapter 1 we learned that establishing an independent
judiciary, limiting discretion, and raising accountability are important aspects of a noncorrupt state. The Communist regime gave Bulgaria the perfect environment for
corruption to take place: they exercised complete control, had unlimited discretion, and
held no one accountable.
Conclusions
Historically, Bulgaria’s government has allowed power to be manifested in
inappropriate ways to actors who are given too much discretion and not enough
accountability. In the Ottoman Empire religion dictated the Rule of Law in Bulgaria,
making an independent, unbiased judiciary impossible. Under the constitutional
monarchy established after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the monarch had full
discretion and control of the government, with no effective judicial checks. Lastly, in the
communist era the Bulgarian Communist Party took control of the judicial system as well
as all other domains of public authority.
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Of all the hurdles Bulgaria must face, combating its historical roots is by far the
most challenging. After the fall of Communism in 1989 Bulgarian officials couldn't just
expect to write a new constitution, snap their fingers, and a democratic state with an
accountable, independent judiciary would appear. Social and economic practices do not
change overnight. Many of the problems we will study in the follow chapters can be
directly attributed to the historical roots of Bulgaria.
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Part 4. Bulgaria’s Current Legal System
The Soviet Union contributed greatly to the shaping of the modern framework and
institutions in current Bulgaria. After the Iron Curtain fell, many of the nations the Soviet
Union was aligned with were left to their own devices. With such great ties to the
Soviets, what would Bulgaria do now that their big brother was out of commission?
Bulgaria, and many other ex-communist nations, was left to decide what to do with their
nation. Latvia for example, chose to reintroduce a previous constitution in order to
establish a working government amid the chaos.
Bulgaria, and most other Eastern European states, was forced to adopt a new
constitution in their transition from communism to democracy. It wasn’t until 1991, two
years after the Berlin Wall fell, that Bulgaria adopted a new constitution to create a
system drastically different than those from Ottoman and Communist regimes. This
system introduced new democratic reforms that worked to protect the rights of the people
as whole, a concept former regimes had lacked. The Bulgarian government is structured
similarly to most western countries. It is a parliamentary system with a three branch
system designed to support the theory of “separation of powers” for the first time in
Bulgarian history.
The Legislative Branch, established by Chapter 3 of the Bulgarian Constitution, is
simply a unicameral National Assembly, known in Bulgaria as the Narodno Sabranie.
With 240 members from all around the nation, the National Assembly is responsible for
passing laws, budgets, and tax rates. Each member is elected by local constituents for a
four year term. Article 66 of the Constitution states that, “The legitimacy of an election
may be contested before the Constitutional Court by a procedure established by law.”
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The Executive Branch is made up of a head of state (the President), a head of
government (the Prime Minister), and a cabinet (the Council of Ministers). The President
of Bulgaria is popularly elected every 5 years. Any natural-born Bulgarian citizen over 40
years of age can run for president. The president has the ability to appoint chairmen of
the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court. The Prime
Minister acts as chief of the Council of Ministers. According to Article 99 of the
Bulgarian Constitution, the “the President shall appoint Prime Minister candidate
nominated by the party holding the highest number of seats in the National Assembly to
form a government.” Lastly for the executive branch, the Council of Ministers is
nominated by the prime minister and elected by the National Assembly. This group is in
charge of drawing up a state budget and executing the state’s foreign policy. Among
many other duties, it is also the Council of Minister’s job to advise the state
administration and armed forces.
Chapter 9 of the Bulgarian Constitution establishes a Grand National Assembly,
which is to address constitutional amendments. This group of nearly 400 members is only
convened when there are constitutional issues. The Assembly has the ability to adopt a
new constitution, resolve on any changes in the territory, and make changes to the
structure of government. When three quarters of the National Assembly and the President
agree to make a constitutional amendment or change this goes directly to the Grand
National Assembly.
The Constitutional Court is a mechanism established in the Constitution for
judicial review. With 12 members, one-third of whom are elected by the National
Assembly, one-third of whom are appointed by the President, and one-third whom are
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elected by a joint meeting of the judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the
Supreme Administrative Court. This court handles matters of constitutionality.
Interestingly enough, unlike the United States Supreme Court, only a few people can
bring a case to the Constitutional Court. An issue can be brought to the Constitutional
Court by the Prosecutor General, the SCC, or the SAC. This court is separate from the
judiciary, but acts as a good mechanism for judicial review, interpreting laws and
international treaties regularly.
Most important to this study is the structure of the Bulgarian Judicial Branch. The
modern judicial branch in Bulgaria was established by the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution,
and was reformed by the Judiciary System Act in 1994. Steven Otfinoski, author of
Nations in Transition;Bulgaria, suggests that, “The judicial branch in many ways has
undergone the least changes since 1991.” (Otfinoski, 46) The branch includes many
actors including judges, court assessors (jurors), prosecutors, and investigating
magistrates working within specific frameworks.
The Judiciary
A Wikileak uncovered a letter written by US Ambassador to Bulgaria Nancy
McEldowney stating that, “on paper, Bulgaria's judiciary system meets most international
and EU standards. But in practice, it is in shambles.” (Wikileaks, 2009) Before delving
into the corrupt practices of the judicial system, it is first essential to understand, at the
very least, how the system is supposed to work. The main goal of the judiciary is to
provide a mechanism for applying and interpreting laws set by the government. It is vital
that the framework and processes of the system are working efficiently. This section
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investigates how the system should work based on the Constitution and the Judiciary
Systems Act of 1994.
The legal system in Bulgaria is based on the civil law system, common to most
continental European countries, in which legislative and constitutional documents are the
only binding source of law in the system. These sources of law are published in the State
Gazette, which is regrettably available exclusively in Bulgarian. Other sources of law are
not formally considered sources, but have persuasive authority5. Case law, for example is
often taken into account in a judge’s decision.
Additionally, especially when addressing international issues, European law is
considered in Bulgaria to be of great importance. As a recent member of the European
Union, Bulgaria must submit to European laws. In addition, the EU places directives on
member states. EU directives lay down specific goals that must be achieved by every
Member State.6 These laws take binding precedence over all national laws. The European
Commission publishes annual an interim reports critiquing Bulgaria’s ability to support
EU laws and to support its own rule of law. These reports are addressed below.
Structurally the judiciary is broken up into three sections. In the judiciary there is
an administrational system that takes responsibility of the entire system, a system of
courts, and system of public prosecution.
Administration
It is exceptionally important for judiciary systems to adopt a mechanism to hold
their employees accountable and to keep the system working properly. The Ministry of

5

Persuasive authority refers to the use of sources of law that aren’t required by the system, but act as an
influence on the judge’s decision.
6
According to the EU cite, Bulgaria and Romania were added as the most recent member states in 2007.
(Europa 2011)
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Justice (MOJ) and the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) oversee the entire judicial system.
The MOJ contributes mostly to budgetary decisions but entertain a little oversight, and
some administrative decisions, while SJC acts as the main overseer of the judicial system.
The Constitution gives this council its power in Article 129, stating that “judges, public
prosecutors and investigating magistrates are appointed, promoted, reduced in rank,
moved and discharged from office by the Supreme Judicial Council.”
The SJC is made up of 25 legal experts with high professional with at least 15
years of experience and having established moral qualities. Figure 2.1 shows the structure
of the SJC. Three positions are required by law to be given to the head of the Supreme
Court of Cassation (SCC), the chairperson of the Supreme Administration Court (SAC)
and the Prosecutor General, all of which are appointed by the President. The Minister of
Justice is head of the council, acting as both a member of government and the head of the
SJC chair. However, this Minister of Justice does not get the right to vote on the SJC.
Eleven of the remaining seats are filled by candidates elected by the National Assembly.
Additionally the last eleven of the SJC are elected by the magistrates. Judges in the
system vote on with six positions, prosecutors contribute to three, and two are chosen by
investigators. Elected members of the SJC have a limit of 5 years in office and they
cannot be reelected for two consecutive terms.
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It’s the SJC’s job to ensure the judicial system is working properly. In meetings
that take place once a week, the SJC can change the number and geographic jurisdiction
of courts and the number of magistrates in each court. Additionally, they can determine
the pay of judges and approve appointments, promotions, dismissals and demotions. The
SJC is also in charge of creating a code of ethics for judges to follow. This institution is
the most important in combating corruption in Bulgaria’s legal system. It is therefore
crucial that the SJC is not corrupt itself. Corruption at this level would cause a ripple
affect throughout the entire system.
Court System
The judiciary of the Republic of Bulgaria is founded upon the framework
established in Chapter 6 of the Constitution. With a total of twenty articles in Chapter 6,
the Constitution attempts to create a system which adheres to democratic values. The
efficiency, and strict use of the court system in Bulgaria is important to keeping
corruption in check.
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The structure of the Bulgarian court system is three tiered. Figure 2.2 is a basic
view of the working of the judicial system. Each court has separate sections and panels
for civil, criminal and administrative court proceedings. Each section is governed by
codes. For example, the criminal sections of these courts are governed by the Criminal
Code of Procedures.
Starting with the lowest of courts, the regional courts are the lowest level of trial
courts. As of 2010 Bulgaria had 113 Regional Courts across the nation. Bulgarians use
these courts as first instance for disputes under 10,000 Bulgarian Leva. 7 Generally
regional courts handle family disputes, labor cases, and less costly civil and commercial
disputes. This is the first impression a citizen has of their judicial system. It is pertinent
that this level of court works effectively and is accessible to the people to ensure the
public use of the courts.

7

10,000 Bulgarian Leva is equivalent to about 6,700 USD and about 5,000 EUR.
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As illustrated in figure 2.1, the District Courts of Bulgaria act as both first and
second instance courts. These courts act as first instance courts for civil, criminal,
commercial, and administrative disputes for claims exceeding 10,000 Leva. Additionally,
the district courts act as an appellate court for cases that start in regional courts. Cases
which start in the regional court are handed down from district courts to the Supreme
Court of Cassation (SCC). Alternatively, cases that start in District Court are handed
down to the Court of Appeals and are then sent to the Supreme Court of Cassation.
There are five established appellate courts across Bulgaria in Bourgas, Plovdiv,
Sofia, Varna, and Verliko Turnovo. These courts are the second instance for cases that
start Bulgaria’s district Courts, but they do not hear cases from the regional courts, or
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administrative cases. The courts of appeals is structured through the use of three-judge
panels. These panels work out of different chambers. For example a civil case that came
to the court of appeals would be tried under a panel of judges from the civil chambers.
Military courts were established to have the same power as district courts. They
hear cases involving military personnel. With only 41 judges, these courts are the
smallest and the most difficult to find information on because of their nature. Military
courts often hear cases that may jeopardize national security if released. Cases heard by
military courts that request appeals go to the courts of appeals and then on to the SCC.
The Judiciary Systems Act mandates the military court to examine all cases on a panel
containing one judge and a court of assessors, who are often officers in the military.
The Supreme Administrative Court is established by Article 125 of the
Constitution. The text of the Constitution states that SAC is responsible for hearing
appeals of administrative acts.
(1) The Supreme Administrative Court shall exercise supreme judicial
oversight as to the precise and equal application of the law in administrative
justice.
(2) The Supreme Administrative Court shall rule on all challenges to the legality
of acts of the Council of Ministers and the ministers, and any other acts envisaged
by the law.
(Chapter 6, Article 125)

The SAC derives its power from the Constitution directly and in charge of all
administrative issues. From time to time acts are questioned and brought to SAC directly.
On this occasion, cases are heard by a three-judge and then a five-judge panel.
Alternatively, cases can reach SAC with prior verdicts and are therefore sent directly to a
five-judge panel. SAC can hear cases from even the lowest local levels of government
and have the last word in their final decisions.
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According to the Bulgarian Constitution, the Supreme Court of Cassation acts as
the “supreme judicial instance in criminal and civil cases”. (Chapter 6 Article 108(1))
The head of this court is nominated by the SJC and voted into a seven year term by the
President. The Judiciary Act calls for the SCC to be broken up into three sections to
address criminal, civil, and commercial issues. (Chapter 8 Article 108(1)) The judges
serve on three-panel committees. With no other option for appeal, the decisions of these
judges are final. This court cannot address issues regarding conflicts with current sources
of law like legislation and the constitution. Instead, those cases are forwarded to the
Constitutional Court to be reviewed.
Judges have very powerful positions in the court system of Bulgaria. The natural
authority given to such a position must be kept in check in the system. Bulgaria, on
paper, has provided the system with these checks. In order for a person to become a
judge, they are required by the Judicial Systems Act of 1994 to be a Bulgarian citizen
who has obtained a law degree and legal competency. Training of these judges is
regulated by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)8. Judges are required to comply with
rules of professional ethics for members of the judiciary by the NIJ. In addition, a person
cannot become a judge if they have been sentenced to prison or has a mental illness.
Every judge, upon entering office, must take an oath to uphold the will of the people:
"I swear by the name of the people that I shall accurately apply the Constitution
and the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria, discharging the duties incumbent on me
guided by my conscience and inner convictions, being impartial, objective and
equitable, contributing to heightening the prestige of the profession, keeping the
secret of deliberations, never forgetting that for all things I do I shall be
answerable to the law. I have been sworn!"
8

The NIJ is an institution that takes responsibility for learning opportunities in the legal system. They
provide the system with initial training, continuing training of magistrates, and training of court
administration. More information can be found at http://www.nij.bg/Articles/Articles.aspx?lang=enUS&pageid=498.
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Judges make up a very important part of the judiciary. Their jobs must both protected and
kept in check in order for this system to run efficiently. The SJC has the ability to
exercise authority over judges in order to keep the system working.
Jurors, or court assessors, are also a large part of Bulgaria’s court system and
process. Juries are used in Regional, District and Military Courts. The Constitution does
not provide details for court assessors, leaving the Judicial System Act to hash out their
responsibilities. Section II, Article 67, of the Act explains that a court assessor must be
between the ages of 21 and 70, in healthy mental condition, with a sound reputation in
society. They cannot have been convicted of a crime. Assessors are chosen by municipal
councils for 5 year terms in the judicial area for the courts they will be serving in.
Military court assessors are a little different. They are chosen by proposal of their
commanding officers of the respective military unit.
The court system in Bulgaria is not particularly difficult to understand. Cases
make their way through Regional, District, Appellate and Supreme courts which are ruled
by judges and assisted by court assessors. Courts are run in a specific manner, and are
kept in check by inspectors from the Supreme Judicial Council.
Public Prosecution and Investigations
The public prosecution is set up to work alongside the court system. In summary,
these are a group of lawyers who are responsible for convicting criminals. The system is
comparable to the District Attorney’s offices in the United States. In 2007 the American
Bar Association stated that there are approximately 1120 prosecutors working in the
country. Each level of court has a prosecution office. Offices in lower courts are
subservient to higher ones.
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At the top of the hierarchy is the prosecutor general, who is nominated by the SJC
and appointed by the president. As head of public prosecution, it is the prosecutor
general’s job to make sure prosecutors are adhering to law. The prosecutor general is
essentially the chief prosecutor and he may revoke decisions of his subordinate
prosecutors. The prosecutor general also contributes to the administrative aspect of the
judicial system as a part of the SJC. (Prosecutor’s office of Bulgaria, 2012)
The rest of the public prosecution is made up of offices in each of the courts. The
service itself is made up of “the Supreme Prosecutor's Office of Cassation, the Supreme
Administrative Prosecutor's Office, five Appellate Prosecutors' Offices, the Military
Appellation Prosecutor's Office, 28 District Prosecutors' Offices, five Military Offices,
and 112 regional Prosecutors' Offices”. Regardless of position in the hierarchy, all
prosecutors are subject to removal by the SJC based on behavior.
In order for the prosecution office to work effectively it must be able to utilize the
investigatorial employees employed by the Bulgarian Investigative Service. This service
is in charge of providing the court with evidence for serious cases. The Judicial System
Act, promulgated in 1994, states that the Bulgarian Investigative Service is responsible
for conducting “investigations of cases with a particular factual or legal complexity,
crimes committed abroad, requests under legal assistance treaties, as well as other cases
provided for by the law”. (Article 122.3) Deputy directors are appointed by the SJC and
beneath them there are various district investigative offices. Unlike policemen, who are in
charge of executing the law, these investigators’ sole job is to find evidence to support
criminal cases in the system.
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Like judges, prosecutors and investigators have a tremendous amount of power in
the Bulgarian judicial system. Prosecutors and investigators must also take an oath to
uphold the will of the people. Their actions often control the final outcome of a case and
they are therefore extremely susceptible to corruption because of this power.
Conclusions
The Bulgarian legal system is replete with powerful positions. Judges, directors,
prosecutors, assessors and investigators are located within an overall system that may
look fairly competent on paper. The concepts presented in this chapter have provided us
with a basic understanding of how the system is supposed to work under the Constitution
and in the Judiciary System Act of 1994. With this knowledge, we can now begin to look
into what is actually happening in Bulgaria.
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Part 5: Corruption in Bulgaria’s Legal System
Transparency International (TI)9 is an excellent and well-respected resource for
researching corruption. The organization was established in 1993 to combat global
corruption. Each year TI issues a report on corruption in nations all over the world. The
reports score researched nations on a scale of one to ten; ten being the least corrupt and
one being the most corrupt. In 2011 globally Bulgaria placed 86th in 182 tested countries
with corruption index score of 3.310. Comparatively, the United States scored a 7.1,
placing 24th internationally. (Transparency International, 2011)
The following chapter addresses some specific institutions in the Bulgarian legal
system . First, with its unique history Bulgaria is affected by historical and cultural issues
surrounding the concept of corruption. As outlined above, there are three important
factors that contribute to a corruption-free legal system; 1) judicial independence, 2)
structure and efficiency, and 3) transparency. Corruption exists in the legal system in
Bulgaria because of inefficiencies in these three factors. This chapter addresses some
very important problems that must be changed in order for the legal system to address
corruption. Low public perceptions, low levels of independence in the judiciary,
inefficient structure, and lack of accountability are the major indicators in the legal
system that creates a corrupt legal system in Bulgaria.
Low Public Perceptions
Bulgaria has been combating corruption throughout its entire existence. We also
learned that the judicial system, because it is a part of a government, is intrinsically a part

9

More information on this Non-governmental organization can be found at www.transparency.org.
TI clearly states that there is a sliding scale on all of its Corruption Indexes. This number could feasibly
be off two tenths of a point.
10
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of the social contract.11 In Bulgaria, the oppressive regimes of the Ottoman Empire and
the confining policies enforced by Communist leaders persistently violated the social
contract, marring public perception of their government. It might be said that the actual
behavior of these regimes gave rise to an understandably alienated and distrustful public
perception of how ‘justice’ was actually administered. Of all the hurdles Bulgaria must
face in reforming their current corrupt judicial system, repairing public trust is almost
certainly the most prominent problem in Bulgaria today.
Statistics prove that Bulgarian citizens simply do not trust their system. Figure 5.1
shows the results of two polls released in a study released by Center for the Study of
Democracy, of the Vitosha Research Center in 2005 and 2007. Between 2005 and 2007
the perception of corruption rose in all occupations, with employees of the judicial
system being at the top of the list. In addition to these statistics, the Agency for Social
Analysis in Bulgaria (ASA Bulgaria) announced in 2011 that 85% of Bulgarians believe
that the Courts protect the rich and the powerful as opposed to protecting the everyday
citizen. 12 (Novinite, 2011)

11

Refer to Part 3
The ASA in Bulgaria released this information in 2011. However, due to lack of resources available in
English by the ASA, this information was retrieved from a popular Bulgarian media source, Novinite.
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=134476
12
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Bulgarians aren’t the only ones who feel their system is corrupt. According to
TI’s data, Bulgaria is perceived to have one of the most corrupt judicial system in the
world. In addition to their Corruption Perception Index Report, TI issues a Global
Corruption Barometer Report to assess global attitudes toward corruption in various
institutions and nations. Responders must rate institutions in individual nations on a scale
of 1 to 5. 1 being not at all corrupt, 5 being extremely corrupt. In 2010 Bulgaria’s score
was 4.3. Only Peru and the Ukraine, with a score of 4.4, scored higher than Bulgaria.
The statistics prove that the public perceptions of the corruption in Bulgaria,
regardless of all of the attempts to reform the judicial system, are not good, and certainly
aren’t getting better. The negative public perception of the Bulgarian legal system has
extreme consequences for the propensity of corruption. Most importantly, if the citizens
of Bulgaria do not trust their institutions, it is logical to assume they are not likely to use
them in a proper manner. Bulgarians who don’t believe they can use their system to gain
justice will turn to alternative measures to get what they need. The Bulgarian Center for
the Study of Democracy released a study claiming that corruption is “further sustained by
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the public’s low trust in state authorities and poor opinion of their effectiveness.” (CSD
Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria, 2010 p. 6) Since the majority of the population
assumes that the system is corrupt, they will likely see corruption as the only way to
navigate through the system.
Eventually a pattern begins to develop over the years. If a system is corrupt and
citizens must resort to corruption to survive in it, the system becomes even more corrupt.
Finally, this results in further negative perceptions. Breaking this cycle is essential to
combating corruption in Bulgaria: as things stand now, a self-reinforcing cycle exists.
The final chapter of this study suggests solutions and tools to rise above this pattern. For
now, however we will move to examine other features of the Bulgarian legal system that
contribute to the corrupt climate.
Institutional and Decisional Independence in Bulgaria
An important step to combating corruption in Bulgaria is addressing the judicial
system’s ability to be completely independent of parties, politics, and private
organizations to prevent inappropriate monopolies. As we learned in Part 2, “monopoly,”
in this context, refers to the power of outside sources to infiltrate the judicial branch and
affect the decisions of individual judges. Judicial branches and judges must operate, on
the whole, independently without ideological or other extra-judicial influences. They
must not be forced into making decisions by parties, religious groups, or organizations.
Bulgaria has been struggling with this concept for hundreds of years. However, the
system has made quite a few improvements to support an independent judiciary.
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Institutional Independence
During the reign of the Ottoman Empire religious ideology pervaded the judicial
system. The result of this was a system that catered to the needs of the Muslim majority.
Similarly, in the Communist regime, a particularly dogmatic form of Marxist-Leninist
political ideology took hold of the nation. The Bulgarian Communist Party exercised
unabridged control between 1946 and 1989, abusing their power to support their own
interests. Currently, perhaps because of the legacy of Communist policies and practices,
some parts of the Bulgarian judicial system are still affected by a culture of self-serving
operation, at the expense of the public good.
The three branches of the Bulgarian government are said to have been set up in a
way that the judicial branch could hold independent status in government. In order for
institutional independence to be achieved, the judicial branch should be given powers of
judicial review. In addition, the branch should practice clear enforcement of laws.
Fortunately, most of the changes in the structure of the system have resulted in marginal
branch independence, at least in comparison to the Communist era. The Constitutional
Court of Bulgaria provides the proper mechanism for judicial review of legislation, at
least from a purely structural perspective. Even though the Constitutional Court is not
technically a part of the judicial system, its enforcement of the law helps to protect the
legal system from infiltration of the system by overbearing political policies.
Parties and organizations do, however, make their way into the judicial branch.
The European Commission announced in its 2012 report on Bulgaria’s cooperation
process:
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Appointing and promoting competent magistrates of high integrity is an
important part of judicial reform. Since last summer, several senior judicial
appointments made by the Supreme Judicial Council and by Parliament have
raised concerns regarding their objectivity, transparency and the thoroughness of
the evaluation of the candidates' merit and integrity.
(European Commission, 2012)
The European Commission is referring perhaps to the wave of appointments in the
judiciary in the Summer and Fall of 2011. Widely publicized in Bulgaria is the case of
Vladimira Yaneva. Yaneva was appointed as Chair of the Sofia City Courts, the biggest
district in Bulgaria, despite only eight years of experience, four of which were filled with
maternity leave. Yaneva won the appointment over Velichka Tsanova, a judge who had
more experience, as Deputy Chair and temporarily in charge of the same court. The
appointment was said to be an infiltration of the executive into the judiciary. Yaneva has
admitted to a close relationship with the Minister of Interior, has no experience in
criminal judicial proceedings, and has consistently ruled in manners benefiting the police
force in Bulgaria. Despite the allegations that these appointments were clear signs of
nepotistic corruption, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that Yaneva’s appointment
was within the law, and is therefore justified. As a statement of complete disapproval,
two members of the Supreme Judicial Council resigned and criticized the appointment
decisions sanctioned by the council.
Appointments based on politics and outside relationships have consistently been a
point of criticism from the European Commission. The European Commission directly
cited Yaneva’s appointment in one of its publications:
[T]he subsequent mobilization of professional associations of magistrates and
civil society calling for reform of the Supreme Judicial Council sends an
important signal of support for judicial reform [and] suggests that Bulgaria must
focus on its appointment process to ensure that the system is not being affected by
outside interests.
(European Commission 2012)
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The European Commission has made it clear that conflicts of interests like Yaneva’s
cannot be overlooked. Many current members of the system also agree. The Yaneva
scandal in the judiciary prompted 1,000 judges to sign a declaration opposing the
“unconvincing personnel choices” of the Supreme Judicial Council. (Steidl, 2011, p. 1)
Structurally, the Supreme Judicial Council is made up of a large number of
politicians, with the Minister of Justice being at the head of the Council. Mandated by the
Bulgarian Constitution, eleven members of the National Assembly made their way into
the Supreme Judicial Council. These members have jobs in the parliament. In addition
they must help to both create and maintain the healthy judicial system. These MPs bring
their own interests to the table when they go to the Supreme Judicial Council; after all,
they’ve been elected based on their interests. There is a serious concern here that the
parliamentary seats in the SJC endanger judicial independence by bringing in party and
lobby influences. The reach that the other branches have into the Supreme Judicial
Council is immense and constitutes a clear violation of the separation of powers.
Decisional Independence
Judges, prosecutors, and investigators within the Bulgarian judicial system must
make decisions based solely on the law and the facts. The perception in Bulgaria is that
the public officials in the court system are being influenced by outside sources, reflecting
a seriously corrupted system. This grave misuse of power by political officials should be
kept in check. The only thing that should hold “monopoly” over a court room is the law.
As noted in Part 2, giving these officials immunity and tenure helps to create an
environment where public officials within the judicial system are free to make their own
decisions without improper influences. The current structure of the system itself lends to
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an environment where judges, prosecutors and investigators are easily influenced by one
another. While the current system has successfully established tenure and immunity for
judges, prosecutors, and investigators, it is evident that the structure of the system leaves
open too many possibilities to sabotage these safeguards. The compromised culture
regarding rule-of-law further compounds the problem, of course.
The Supreme Judicial Council, which oversees the entire judicial system, is
comprised of judges, prosecutors, and investigators from the system itself. As these
employees work every day, they are clearly aware that their decisions are being watched
by their co-workers, who could one day have a say in their promotion, demotion, or
removal. The ABA reports that, “a judge ruling for the defendant in a criminal case does
so knowing that the prosecutor who just lost the case may someday be in position to
influence the judge’s career advancement, and almost certainly reports directly or
indirectly to another prosecutor who will”. (American Bar Association, 2006) This
structure has not surprisingly contributed to strong friendships being made between
prosecutors, lawyers and judges. This unhealthy system seems to have been placed with
the intention of creating an environment where everyone works together as a team. The
power of these relationships is supposed to be used for good -- instead, it is abused.
Unfortunately, the result is a faulty system where judges often fear that their jobs might
be at stake when they are making their decisions. The 2012 European Commission report
has made it clear that there is a need for reform in the manner of selecting Supreme
Judicial Council members in order to increase its transparency and objectivity.
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Efficiency and Structure of the Bulgarian Legal System
Legal systems should be intrinsically organized to both serve the needs of the
magistrates and the needs of the public. Efficiency of this structure is vital in attempts to
keep judges in check, and to deter corrupt practices. Structurally, legal systems must
adopt an efficient appeals process to correct mistakes made by previous judges,
prosecutors and investigators. If the process is not working properly, justice simply will
not be carried out. Overall the Bulgarian court system is disorganized and inefficient. The
biggest problem contributing to this inefficiency in Bulgaria is the pervasive lack of
assistants in courtrooms to aid judges, resulting in a back up of an already large number
of case loads per judge. In addition, the lack of training for members of the legal system
contributes to a less modern system.
According to the ABA’s study on Bulgaria, in 2006 lower courts simply did not
have assistants. Therefore, judges had to spend their own time doing menial tasks like
filing cases and legal research. Judges should not be spending their valuable time filing
paper work; they have been trained to hear cases and deliver decisions. Any extra work
can take away from a judge’s ability to work through his/her caseload. A popular
Bulgarian news source, Novinite, ran a story in February of 2012 revealing that the
Supreme Judicial Council uncovered cases filed in 2004-2006 for crimes committed in
1995-1997 that are still dragging on and clogging the Sofia City Court. (Novinite, 2012)
This dead weight on the judicial system costs time, money, and ultimately results in a lag
in the judicial system; yet when one considers that this ‘dead weight’ contributes to the
difficulty of carrying out much-needed reforms, it is easy to see how corrupted officials
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would be slow to try to cast off the weight. It is also easy to see how this pattern
contributes to the negative perceptions of the entire system by the general public.
The delays in administering judgments, which are sometimes intentional, leave
many judicial decisions nearly meaningless. Of course, problems with case delays can be
attributed to other factors. For example, a shortage of courtrooms for hearings to take
place might contribute to case delays. Additionally, difficulties arise when trying to
coincide the appearances of parties and witnesses at court proceedings. With its threeinstance court system, the appellate review process is already in place, at least
structurally. Unfortunately, due to lack of proper help in the court rooms, case load levels
are growing higher and higher. Figure 5.2 shows the rise in caseload in the court system
between 2002 and 2006.
With larger case loads, the appellate process is severely constricted. The trends
offered by this table suggest that caseloads continue to rise. Unfortunately, more recent
statistics are not available in English to compare in this study. However, the European
Commission stated in its 2012 interim report that a new important study to rationalize the
workload of magistrates has been launched by the National Institute for Justice; the
problem certainly hasn’t diminished.
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On a different but related note, comparatively the caseloads per each court district
are not equally dispersed. Figure 5.3, taken from the World Bank’s Report on Bulgaria in
2008 shows how unevenly dispersed cases are in the Bulgarian court system. This
variance suggests that the court system is not working efficiently enough. As one might
expect, the less amount of work load the average judge has, the higher the disposition
rate. Ultimately, somehow, there needs to be a way to even the caseload across the
nation.
Education is also another important part of creating an efficient judicial system.
As with any workplace environment, processes run much more smoothly when all the
employees know their jobs. The ABA suggested that in spite of newly established
training mechanisms supported by the National Institute of Justice, judges are often
appointed to their positions without the use of training programs and orientation
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processes. (American Bar Association, 2006 p. 2) These appointments of incompetent
people are simply unacceptable. Unskilled judges not only are unable to handle casework,
but they seriously undermine the quality of decisions in the legal system.

The Bulgarian legal system is not efficient enough to successfully serve the needs
of both magistrates and the public. The consequences of backed-up court systems are
acute, grave, and mutually compounding. Backups in the system make it nearly
impossible for the court system to do its job. Most important, however, if the judicial
system appears to be too cumbersome, some citizens will likely decide that paying a
bribe is much easier, and less time consuming.
Accountability
According to Anti-corruption Reforms in Bulgaria: Key Results and Risks, a 2006
report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Bulgarians believe that corruption is
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one of the most serious problems in the country. Citizens want to be able to hold public
officials accountable for their corrupt acts. According to Klitgaard’s formula 13, keeping
accountability high is the best way to keep corruption under control in any environment.
The higher the accountability in the system, the less likelihood of corruption spreading.
The key to addressing this issue of accountability is supporting overall transparency in
the system and a upholding code of ethics that holds magistrates accountable.
Transparency can be achieved in a legal system through processes that open up
the judicial system to the public. In a completely transparent system corruption can be
more easily detected. In recent reforms headed by USAID, Bulgaria’s judicial system has
become far more transparent by providing the courts with the technological advances
needed to publish decisions. Before USAID came in, cases were published in summaries
as opposed to the word-for-word system we have here in the United States. Most
Bulgarian courts now have access to the technology to record and publish their cases. At
all levels of the court system, at least some cases can be found online in modern
Bulgarian.
Despite these new technologies, according to the EC, court final decisions are not
yet systematically published and guidelines for publication have not been established.
(European Commission, 2011) In addition to these measures, Bulgaria has developed a
strong media that regularly publishes articles following the decisions made in the legal
system. All court hearings and proceedings are open to the public unless it is prohibited
by law.14

13

Refer to page 11.
For example, cases involving minors are not allowed to be covered by the media and are considered
closed trials.
14
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In order for a legal system to work efficiently without corruption, a code of
ethics should be adopted and protected by the administrations. Judges should be held
accountable by an ethics committee and their administrators. In Bulgaria, all magistrates
are held accountable by the Supreme Judicial Council. It is the Supreme Judicial
Council’s job to ensure that the prosecutors, judges, and investigators are acting within
the law. The Supreme Judicial Council has the ability to promote, demote, or remove a
judge, investigator, or prosecutor from office. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Council
has recently created an ethics committee.
The Supreme Judicial Council has a tremendous amount of power in the judicial
system; any misuse of this power is a serious issue of high level corruption. The council’s
appointment of Vladimira Yaneva is most concerning. In spite of her lack of experience
and apparent conflicts of interest, Yaneva was able to coast through the system and is
now the sitting judge in Sofia’s Court. Novinite reported on February 2 of 2012 that the
Supreme Judicial Council had to issue a reprimand to Yaneva for creating 2 to 3 month
delays in 31 of her cases. For this, she was docked 10% of her pay. With such
controversy in the appointment, and Yaneva’s poor performance, it’s hard not to wonder
why the Supreme Judicial Council continues supporting this judge. Corruption has not
been proven yet, but the circumstances certainly are suspicious.
More recently the Council attempted to create an ethics committee in an attempt
to curb corruption in the legal system. A new ethics code offered jointly by judges,
inspectors, and prosecutors was accepted by the Supreme Judicial Council. The ethics
commission was created to support these codes. In its 2012 Interim publication the
European Commission stated that, “The ethics commission of the Supreme Judicial
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Council and the newly established local ethics commissions have not yet been able to
deliver proper integrity screening in the context of recent appointments and appraisals.”
According to the ABA the Code of Ethics for each discipline are not widely accepted or
followed. (American Bar Association, 2006)
It is the Supreme Judicial Council’s job to hold judges, magistrates, and
prosecutors to a code of ethics, and they simply aren’t succeeding in doing this. One
could argue that the structure of the Council is a great hindrance on its ability to provide
for the legal system. The final chapter of this study puts forth ideas for restructuring the
Supreme Judicial Council effectively.
Conclusions
Corruption, like a temperamental plant, needs a particular environment to
flourish. Bulgaria, while not completely a lost cause, provides a perfect example of an
environment where corruption can grow. With the large amount of extra-judicial sources
affecting the legal system, Bulgaria must work hard to establish a more independent
judiciary. Additionally, the system is severely affected by the lack of accountability and
efficiency. Bulgaria has numerous hurdles to overcome in order to combat these serious
problems. Perhaps the biggest obstacle Bulgaria must overcome is the dreadfully low and
negative public perception of the judicial system.
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Part 6: Solutions for Bulgaria's Corrupt Legal System
Bulgaria has made a lot of changes since those Ottoman days. However, the
nation has much to do in order to cultivate a legal establishment where corruption is less
likely to sprout. As noted in Part 5, Bulgaria has particular problems with low public
perceptions, keeping its judiciary independent, sustaining an efficient structure, and
holding judges, prosecutors and investigators accountable for their actions. This final
chapter is devoting to finding solutions for these problems in order to create a healthier
judiciary in Bulgaria.
Changing Perceptions
The local and global perceptions of corruption in the Bulgarian legal system are
extremely negative and, as we learned in the previous chapter, have even resulted in
further corruption. Changing popular culture and its perceptions is certainly not an easy
feat, but it is crucial for the system to gain public trust in order to work efficiently. Since
many of these negative feelings towards the judicial institutions are based on historical
experiences, they are deeply rooted and thus are not likely to be overcome easily or soon.
Time and education are the only complete answers in changing perceptions in Bulgaria.
Education is an extremely important tool that can be used to combat false
perceptions of the system. Perceptions are not always reality. Ignorance of current
changes in the system will create a false view of what is actually going on. In reality,
there may be some remarkable things occurring in the system. Education starts in the
schools, with the young. In addition, as things change through reforms, the older
population can be educated through media. The more accurately the media is able to
share sources with the public, the more educated they will be. Assuming that the judicial
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system continues to move toward non-corrupt policies, over time more education will
change the public perception of the Bulgarian legal system. Thus patience, persistence,
and determined leadership are key factors in any successful long-term change.
Ultimately, in order for the public to begin thinking more highly of their judicial
institutions, the institutions must begin working with lower levels of corruption. The
public will slowly learn about reforms and trust can be regained between the people and
the system.
Judicial Independence
In order for Bulgaria to be able to overcome corruption it must continue to uphold
a strong judicial branch. The current judicial system is managed by one institution, the
Supreme Judicial Council, partially comprised of members of Parliament and partially
comprised of active members of the judiciary. It is thus a structure of inherently
compromised judicial independence. This system clearly endangers the independence of
the judiciary and must be reformed.
There are a couple of ways the Supreme Judicial Council could be reformed to
protect the judicial system from outside influences. The first option is to lower the
number of seats reserved for the National Assembly. Doing this would give judicial
members the ability to outvote members of parliament if party politics became an issue.
This option simply does not resolve the greater issue. The Lockean argument for a noncorrupt nation suggests that, in order for the liberty of the people to be protected, a
government must be structured in a way that powers are completely separate. The only
way to secure judicial independence in Bulgaria is to have an administrative body made
up only of acting magistrates; the elimination of parliament seats is absolutely necessary.
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With a system entirely made up of magistrates who are elected from within the judiciary,
the remaining seats should be allocated evenly among prosecutors, judges, and
investigators.
Currently the MOJ works on the budget and sends along funding to the SJC to
disburse in the legal system. The World Bank strongly opposes this practice.
It would be desirable for the SJC and MOJ to formalize a
collaborative model through which they jointly prepare the judiciary’s
budget. There is significant room for a collaborative agreement to
improve the system as it currently exists, starting with basic documents
and processes. A more strategic set of budget preparation guidelines –
jointly issued by the SJC and MOJ – is urgently required and could act
as a crucial coordination mechanism. Improved guidelines will also allow
more constructive budget negotiations. A more strategic approach to
budget preparation can improve budget quality – enhancing the judiciary’s
ability to advocate for resources. (World Bank, 2008 p. 7)
As the World Bank so aptly phrased, it is essential to Bulgaria’s institutional judicial
independence that the SJC has a larger role in setting the budget for the legal system.
The judicial seats in the Supreme Judicial Council are held by judges, prosecutors,
and investigators from the system itself. With their futures in mind, judges, prosecutors,
and investigators have been said to have adopted unhealthy relationships resulting in
nepotism. The Bulgarian Ministry of Justice suggested that the best strategy to deal with
this issue is to create a separation of judges within the SJC when “personnel issues are
made: appointment, appraisal, disciplinary proceedings, in order to take into account the
specifics of the status of judges and prosecutors.” (Ministry of Justice, 2009 p. 19)
Separating the SJC into commissions when personal issues come up is an ideal way to
handle this situation. This way, judges will not be enticed to have corrupt relationships
with prosecutors. Nepotism will less likely be used in order to avoid problems in years to
come.
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Upholding a strong independent judicial branch and independent judges is
exceptionally important in creating a system where corruption can be limited. It is evident
in the research here that Bulgaria's judicial branch and employees simply aren’t working
independently. In order to change this Bulgaria must face serious reforms in its
administrative structure in order curb these outside influences.
Efficiency of the Court Systems
It is extremely important that court systems in a legal system are able to run
efficiently. Even the most minor hiccups in these procedures could potentially result in a
miscarriage of justice. The Bulgarian court system is clearly under a lot of strain and
must undergo some drastic reforms in order to run efficiently.
First, it is necessary to address the workload of judges in the system. It is
important that judges focus on hearing and delivering decisions on cases. Adding menial
paperwork and filing only contributes to their stress. In order to lift weight off these
judges, each court in the nation should be scrutinized in the way it is run. The amount of
employees on location, and the resources they have, should be altered to take the weight
off of judges. Taking the menial responsibilities of the judges off their shoulders will
undoubtedly decrease the number of backlogged cases.
The disparity in the distribution of cases across the nation is a problem that should
be seriously considered and addressed. According to the chart from the World Bank (See
figure 5.3 in Part 5) the courts in Sofia receive the highest caseload per judge and provide
the lowest disposition rates. Ideally, the chart would even out, giving most judges the
same amount of cases regardless of location. The courts are in severe need of
restructuring; common sense would say that overworked judges are less likely to make
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proper decisions. The answer to this problem is a complete overhaul of the current court
system and a restructure to utilize every court equally.
In addition, it is also necessary to ensure that each employee of the judicial
system is properly trained and educated. The National Institute for Justice (NIJ), a
Bulgarian judicial training institute, has only recently begun to propose stringent rules on
training of judicial employees. In 2010 the NIJ published an eager strategy they created
in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, 15 which outlined some reforms they were
working on in educating the public employees of the legal system. As a part of these
reforms the NIJ and MOJ wanted to increase the amount of education drastically,
addressing issues of entry-level positions and continuing education for current members
of the judiciary. The fourteen page document contains numerous well conceived ideas for
changing the duration of training for entry level employees from six to nine months.
(MOJ, 2010 p. 4) These ideas represent an excellent start. The EC commended Bulgaria
on making these first steps in its interim report. (European Commission, 2012)
Accountability
Accountability of individual members of the judicial system is most important to
create an environment where corruption is less likely to grow. As noted in Part 2, there
are two ways of promoting accountability in judicial systems. The first is to promote high
levels of transparency. Second, it is important to hold judges accountable through a code
of ethics that the system must adopt as a whole.

15

The strategy is called the “Strategy for continuation of the reform of the judicial system in Bulgaria under
the country’s full membership to the European Union within the period 2011-2012”. It was developed by
the Ministry of Justice and adopted through a Decision number 441 of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria
of June 28th 2010. (, 2010)
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In Bulgaria, the transparency of the legal process has not increased to acceptable
levels, particularly when in comes to the appointment process. The SJC should begin to
become more transparent in their actions. Cases like Yaneva’s simply cannot be
permitted. Available positions in the Council should be announced publicly to encourage
competition in elections. It would also be quite practical to make records of meetings and
transcripts of decisions made on matters within the council available to the public. Such
transparency will not only increase the public trust, but create a system that can be more
easily monitored, thus reducing the likelihood of corruption and thus contributing to an
even greater augmentation of a positive perceptions by the public. In this way, the
presently self-reinforcing negative perceptions may be transformed into a self-reinforcing
positive dynamic.
Transparency in the system overall can also be heightened to newer levels.
Updating technologies in the system has allowed for the Bulgarian legal system to begin
working a little more openly. However, the consistent use of these technologies should be
increased and monitored. In response to this problem, a board should be created within
the SJC to monitor the transparency of each and every court. The board could oversee the
use of these technologies to publicize court proceedings, their judges’ assets, the
proceedings in the courts, and other important information the public has a right to
know.
The prevailing culture surrounding the current Code of Ethics in Bulgaria also
needs to be changed. How can the general public take a document like the Code of Ethics
seriously when the judicial practitioners themselves so pervasively fail to do so? The best
solution would be to create a rewards system. Those who follow the codes consistently
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should be given a raise; those who don’t should be punished. The ethics committee needs
to be strong in enforcing these rewards. The restructuring of the SJC, where the ethics
committee is derived from, will also help to create a more effective ethics committee.
Conclusions
With extremely low public perceptions, low levels of independence in the
judiciary, inefficient structure, and lack of accountability in the legal system, Bulgaria
has a lot to work on. Most important however is the grooming of the administration. The
Supreme Judicial Council, as the head administrative body, needs to be restructured
completely to stop outside sources from infiltrating the legal system. This institution is at
the top of the pyramid, corruption in higher levels will undoubtedly trickle down and
affect the rest of the system. It is therefore of the utmost importance to reform the SJC
first to secure judicial independence. Other reforms should be taken seriously as well.
The adoption of, and adherence to, a well-respected code of ethics in the legal system
among judges, prosecutors and investigators is essential in creating an accountable
system.
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Final Conclusions
Bulgaria’s story is certainly a very interesting one. Bulgarians have successfully
fought off the oppressive Islamic regime of the Ottoman Empire and the tyrannical
Communist regime to reach democracy. Even with of all their struggles, Bulgaria still
must face more. In 2009 the Pew Research Center released a poll of Bulgarian public
opinion two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As a part of this poll, Bulgarians
were asked if they were satisfied with democracy. Surprisingly only 21% answered that
they were satisfied. In addition, only 11% of those polled felt as though the fall of
communism benefited the locals and a whopping 62% stated that Bulgaria is worse of
now without communism. These striking numbers shed light on how truly serious the
problems in Bulgaria are. The majority of Bulgarians identify the judicial system as the
most important element of public authority that needs to be reformed in order to make the
entire political system work better.
This study has revealed that healthy judicial systems are able to combat
corruption by supporting an independent judiciary, maintaining a transparent system, and
keeping personal discretionary levels as low as possible. Regardless, despite all these
measures, it is important to keep in mind that a fool-proof system simply cannot exist.
However, following these steps helps create an environment where corrupt acts are
brought to account and hopefully over time are thereby reduced in number and
seriousness.
Bulgaria has clearly struggled with maintaining these safeguards since its
adoption of democracy in 1991. Bulgaria is in dire need of limiting corruption in the legal
system. With extremely low public perceptions, low levels of independence in the
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judiciary, inefficient structure, and lack of accountability in the legal system, Bulgaria
has a lot to work on. Solutions to these problems must be sought quickly before the
currently prevailing patterns in the Bulgarian legal system become even more deeply
entrenched and thus even less amenable to resolution.
Reforming the entire judicial system is needed. The Supreme Judicial Council, as
the head administrative body, is in dire need of restructuring in order to secure, strong
judicial independence. The court systems need to become more efficient and its members
must be educated, trained properly, and held accountable. Once Bulgaria starts to make
these improvements, public perception should begin get better. One can only hope that
with these changes, the Pew Research Center might be able to report better poll results in
its next study.
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